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Close interaction between psychology and philosophy is certainly not 
a novelty, since the various schools – associationism, psychoanalysis, be-
haviorism, etc. – were born with strong philosophical assumptions. With 
the gradual but consistent introduction of scientific methods, psychol-
ogy became more and more independent and rightfully claimed a place 
among the human sciences. The 20th century has seen incredibly rap-
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id growth in branches of psychology –   e.g., cognitive, social, personal-
ity, moral, developmental, evolutionary, and cultural psychology– to the 
point that it has become impossible for any single scholar to have an en-
compassing picture of the whole field, mirroring what happens in other 
sciences as well, such as physics, biology and sociology. Far from discour-
aging, the situation rather speaks of the fruitfulness of psychology and of 
its potential to engage in serious dialogue with other disciplines, insofar 
they share a common interest.
More recently, cognitive psychologists have used the resources of psy-
chological science to study the foundations of religion, and to discuss 
and possibly illuminate issues of concern for theologians. The new field, 
known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR), draws from work by Er-
nest Thomas Lawson, Robert McCauley, Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett, 
among others. Many of its scholars are inspired by a spirit of collabora-
tive work with theologians and philosophers of religion, emphasizing the 
need of serious cross-training between disciplines. Driven by the same 
spirit, the present issue of Scientia et Fides documents instances of inte-
grative work at the intersection of psychological science and philosoph-
ical or theological knowledge, specifically centered around our under-
standing of what a person is. We hope that, apart from their individual 
worth, as a whole these contributions will stimulate further interdisci-
plinary studies, in order to achieve genuine science-engaged philosophy 
and theology, and a science that is aware of philosophical and theologi-
cal discussions.
We have deliberately not chosen one specific notion or definition of 
personhood to serve as a guide, in order to allow for different but not 
necessarily rivalling conceptions. Still, it seems safe to claim that a cor-
rect understanding of persons – be it in the form of a definition proper or 
as a description– should accommodate all dimensions of our human ex-
perience: embodiment, subjectivity, interiority, relationality, spirituality, 
morality and transcendence, and that all these dimensions fall within the 
study field of both science and philosophy/theology.
The first two papers deal with the general conceptual framework that 
is necessary for a fruitful interaction to take place. Erin I. Smith discusses 
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the differences emerging from psychological and neuroscientific research 
on the self, which impact on our understanding of persons. Whereas de-
velopmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs in individ-
uals’ stable sense of self, neuroscientific studies seem to uncover a mul-
titude of de-centralized neural networks in competition as responsible 
for individuals’ sense of self. Smith explores how to bring together these 
divergent empirical views to advance understanding about personhood, 
as well as how philosophy and theology can inform scientific research on 
the self. Drawing from philosophical considerations, Juan F. Franck pro-
poses that the rich variety of methods in psychological research used to 
study human subjectivity could find a robust and also flexible conceptu-
al framework in the phenomenological understanding of the person. The 
one using empirical methods, the other seeking the foundations of expe-
rience, psychology and phenomenology both converge in disclosing the 
person-centeredness of our lifeworld, which is impregnated by all our vi-
tal, cultural, ethical, social and religious interests.
The idea that philosophical claims underlie widespread cultural ten-
ets, whether we are aware of them or not, is well documented in Juan Pa-
blo Roldán’s article. A tacit “philosophical dogma” would be present in 
many cultural trends, both philosophical and psychological, namely that 
a substantive conception of the person stands in the way of interpersonal 
communion. Roldán claims that sharing and communicating is at the op-
erative level, whereas individuality qualifies the person ontologically. Far 
from being an obstacle, a robust sense of being an individual self, would 
be a condition for true sharing. The tacit assumption of a dualist stance 
supporting a robust self has often resulted in a problematic understand-
ing of persons, compromising them as truly relational individuals.
Scott Harrower’s and Kyle Strobel’s papers exploit the resources of 
psychology for theological investigation, which in turn raises new ques-
tions for psychological research. Harrower argues that proponents of us-
ing a person as an analogy for the Godhead will be better served by using 
a psychologically informed analogy of a “self” instead. He argues that the 
“Dialogical Self Analogy” for the Godhead is more likely to uphold God’s 
trinitarian nature, avoid trinitarian confusion and related problems than 
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“person” analogies do. On this view, the primary benefit of speaking of 
God as a Dialogical Self is that it offers a psychologically modelled anal-
ogy for God, whilst avoiding the language of person, yet strongly taking 
into account God’s trinitarian nature. This has the important benefit of 
preserving the concept and language of “person” for the trinitarian per-
sons (the prosopa/hypostases), and hence avoiding the linguistic, con-
ceptual and ecumenical confusion that arises when referring to the God-
head as a person.
Strobel addresses gratitude as an element of human flourishing. He 
does so by analyzing 18th century theologian Jonathan Edwards’s distinc-
tion between natural and supernatural gratitude to God, together with 
its implications for psychology. A Christian account of gratitude has to 
contemplate both forms. The opening or enlargement of the self to an-
other mirrors God’s self-giving and is a response based on God’s action in 
the soul, going thus beyond the possibilities of human nature alone. The 
consideration of the two forms of gratitude also sheds light on the impact 
gratitude has on human wellbeing, on our attitude towards oneself and 
others. There is here abundant work to be done.
Taking recourse to recent empirical studies in social and cognitive 
psychology Natasza Szutta defends the classical notion of virtue against 
the critiques of situationists. The author claims that contrary to what sit-
uationists think, there is empirical evidence that moral character war-
rants a morally good action and does not go against the necessary flex-
ibility that human situations require from the moral agent. Virtue is not 
classically understood as a repetition of identical or similar acts, but rests 
on the dynamic and flexible development of an ability rooted on human 
experience and action. At any rate a strong moral character seems to be 
a firm condition for upright behavior.
José Víctor Orón Semper and Miriam Martínez Mares argue against 
a fragmented understanding of human reality and propose instead an in-
tegral approach to human action, relying on psychological, theological 
and philosophical considerations. They introduce interiority as a neces-
sary element to account for the person’s complexity, which they see re-
flected in several interacting levels. Not everything is amenable to a fixed 
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conceptualization, however, and a  realistic and open-minded under-
standing of the person must acknowledge that there always remains in 
her something unfathomable and mysterious.
Claudia E. Vanney and Ignacio Aguinalde suggest that the excess of 
specialization in contemporary research can be overcome by means of 
a collaborative process of social cognition. To illustrate the dynamics of 
a successful interdisciplinary research team they propose an extension of 
the psychological notion of joint attention towards what they call joint in-
tellectual attention. This kind of joint attention involves a shared aware-
ness of sharing the cognitive process of knowledge, and therefore re-
quires specific intellectual dispositions and virtues from team members. 
It appears that not only focusing on a common object is a condition for 
effective interdisciplinarity, but also establishing some kind of second-
person relatedness.
